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The  Johns  Hopkins  University What was different  about the collapse  of the Asian emerging markets  in 1997? The free fall 
of the Mexican  peso and the collapse of the Mexican Bolsa produced  a “Tequila  effect” that  spread 
through  most of  South America, but did not  create  a sell off in the global financial  markets  similar 
to that which  occurred  on 27 October  1997. Normally,  sharp declines in prices  in emerging  equity 
markets  produce  a “flight  to  quality”,  in which  international  investors  shift their  funds  back  into 
developed  country  markets  and  local  investors  seek  to  protect  their  wealth  by  diversifying  into 
developed  country  assets. Yet, the collapse in the Asian emerging markets, that  started  in Thailand, 
spread to the other  second-tier Newly Industrialising  Economies  (NIEs), and eventually  extended  to 
the  first-tier  NIEs  produced  the largest absolute  declines ever experienced  in the major  developed 
country  equity markets.  If equity markets can suffer from what Alan Greenspan  has called “irrational 
exuberance”,  the  Asian crisis suggests that  they  may also suffer from “irrational  pessimism”.  Yet, 
there  is much to  indicate  that  in this case the financial  markets  in Japan, Europe  and the  US  were 
quite rational  in assessing the global implications  of the financial crisis in Asia. 
The developing  countries  in Asia have come to play a crucial role in global growth.  In the 
1990s  they accounted  for roughly  half of global expansion. The immediate  implication  of the Asian 
crises is that the collapse of growth  in the region would produce  a global deflation. This would  make 
it more difficult for developed economies, particularly Europe  and Japan, to expand at rates necessary 
to generate  sufficient investment to produce reductions  in unemployment.  Recovery  in the developed 
world  outside the US and the UK is thus at risk as a result of declining Asian growth.  Indeed,  if the 
US cannot  continue  its current  expansion, there  is a clear risk of a global depression  similar to that 
of the  1930s. 
The stage for the decline in growth  in the Asian region  has been set by what may be called a 
1 series  of  competitive  devaluations  amongst  the  currencies  in  the  region.  The  combination  of 
globdisation  of production  and  economic  development  in these  countries  has  advanced  to  the  point 
that  a substantial  proportion  of their  trade  is now  within  the  Asian  region  (including  Japan),  rather 
than  with  the  developed  economies.’  It has been  based  on a progressive  upgrading  of the value  added 
to  production,  as represented  in the  idea  of the  “flying  geese”.  But,  the  logic  of the  “flying  geese” 
model  is that  progress  to  more  advanced  stages  of  development  is determined  by relative  rates  of 
increase  in productivity,  income  per  capita  and  real  wages,  Since  much  of  the  trade  is linked  to  a 
division  of  labour  within  the  region,  with  Japan  and  the  more  advanced  NIEs  exporting  capital 
equipment  and  semi-finished  goods  to be assembled  in S.E.  Asia and then  shipped  on to others  before 
final  export  to  developed  country  markets,  stable relative  costs  and  prices  have  played  an important 
part  of in regional  integration  and development.  Currency  instability  is very  disruptive  to this process, 
causing  random  shifts  in the  relative  position  of individual  countries  and  in their  development  plans. 
Thus,  the  entire  logic  of the  South  East  Asian  development  process  would  be  disrupted  by volatile 
cross  rates  of  exchange  of  the  currencies  of the  countries  in the  area  creating  changes  in relative 
competitiveness  independent  of  changes  in productivity  and  per  capita  income  levels.  If  restrictive 
policies  are necessary  to  restore  the  currency  stability  required  to  allow  the  “flying  geese”  system  of 
relative  positions  on  the  value-added  ladder  to  function,  then  growth  will  fall and  the  demand  for 
exports  from  the  developed  countries  will  decline. 
While  it is true  that  neither  the  US  nor  Europe  depend  on Asia  for  a substantial  proportion 
of  their  exports  (the  US  exports  less  than  20  per  cent  and  Europe  little  over  5 per  cent),  it  is an 
integral  part  of  the  process  of  globalisation;  while  the  US  may  not  export  much  to  Asia,  US 
companies  do import  to  and  export  from  their  production  facilities in Asia,  so that  the  overall  impact 
on US  income  will be much  higher.2  And  these  companies  are primarily  in the  high technology  area, 
that  has  been  at the  basis  of the  restructuring  of the  US  economy  and the  performance  of US  equity 
’  In 1994, the exports of the Asean-  plus the first-tier  NIEs to developing  East Asia plus Japan was $172 billion and 
to the other developed  market economies  $168 billion. with another $44 billion to the rest of the world. See UNCTAD. 
1996, Table  24, p. 88. 
’  For example,  the percentage  of total imports into the US from affiliates  of US companies  is  over  19 per cent from 
Thailand, over  18 per cent from Malaysia,  and nearly  14 per cent from Indonesia.  The share for Hong Kong  is over 
50 per cent and Singapore  over 80 per cent. Korea  is less than  3 percent  while the Phillipines  is just over 5 per cent. 
2 markets.  But  how  was  it  possible  for  one  of  the  most  successful  development  areas  to  suffer  a 
virtually  complete  reversal  of fortunes  in less than  a year? 
An  Interpretation  of the  Asian  Crisis 
The  Asian  &isis  was  not  a typical  balance  of payments  crisis,  such  as those  experienced  with 
such  frequency  under  the  Bretton  Woods  system,  or the  Mexican  peso  crisis  of  1994/5.  In Mexico, 
rapid  liberalisation  of  domestic  markets  caused  imports  to  grow  much  more  rapidly  than  exports. 
Tight  monetary  policy to reduce  inflation  produced  high interest  rates,  which  attracted  foreign  capital 
inflows  to  deregulated  and liberalised  domestic  financial  markets  which  financed  the  trade  gap,  while 
it  also  caused  real  appreciation  of  the  peso  which  further  worsened  the  trade  balance  by  turning 
relative  prices  against  exports.  The  capital  inflows  also  encouraged  import  growth  as  foreign 
borrowing  allowed  domestic  banks  to  compete  for  domestic  market  share  by lending  to  households 
to  finance  consumption  and to  arrange  foreign  exchange  loans  to  domestic  business  at international 
interest  rates.  The  result  was  a continually  increasing  Mexican  payments  deficit,  along  with  record 
increases  in banks’  non-performing  loans,  a fall in private  savings  and low  domestic  investment,  with 
slow  growth  and  rising  unemployment  accompanying  a fall in the  rate  of inflation  and  a government 
budget  surplus. 
Irrespective  of the  reversal  of US  interest  rate  policy,  which  was  initiated  in February  1994, 
the  real  appreciation  of the  peso  would  eventually  have  collided  with  the  increasing  external  deficit, 
and  Mexico  would  have  experienced  an exchange  rate  crisis  that  would  have  been  aggravated  by  a 
domestic  financial  crisis  due  to  bad  bank  loans  to  households  and  foreign  currency  exposure  of 
business  clients.3 
The  Asian  crisis  of  1997 has been  very  different.  Most  countries  have  been  near  surplus  on 
3  The Mexican  crisis did differ from prior  experience  because  of the large build up of foreign  holdings  of domestic 
financial  assets, including  government  securities,  such as Tesobonos that paid returns linked to the US dollar. The IMF 
bailout  package  thus  served primarily  to provide  an exit for foreign  holders  of peso-denominated  Tesobonos  while 
preserving  currency  convertibility.  The IMF funding,  rather than  supporting  current  account  convertibility  was thus 
used for the first time  in history  to ensure  capital account  convertibility.  The Mexican  crisis thus might be said to be 
the  mid-point  between  a  standard  Bretton  Woods  style  current  account  deficit  caused  exchange  rate  crisis  with 
restricted  capital flows and a financial  asset crisis exchange  rate crisis under free global movement  of capital. 
3 their  trade  balance,  if not  on  their  current  account  balances,  and  have  a long-term  record  of  fiscal 
rectitude.  Imports  were  not  dominated  by luxury  consumption  goods,  savings  ratios  were  extremely 
high  and  banks  were  not  financing  unsustainable  consumption  booms.  Foreign  exchange  reserves 
were  high  and  exchange  rates  had  been  stable  throughout  the  1990s.  Yet,  there  was  a discernible 
tendency  towards  deterioration  in  the  foreign  account  caused  by  a fall-off  in the  rapid  growth  of 
exports  in most  countries.  But,  this  was  caused  not  by  changes  in what  had  until  that  time  been 
successful  internal  stabilisation  policy,  but rather  by changes  in the  external  environment,  over  which 
they  had  little  control  and  there  were  few  policy  responses  available.  This  is a characteristic  of the 
world  of increased  economic  interdependence  and  free  global  capital  flows. 
External Balance 
Current  account  balances  had  already  started  to  show  weakness  throughout  the  region  in 
1994.  This was,  in part,  due  to  the  sharp  fall-off  in import  growth  in the developed  countries.  For  the 
developed  countries  as a whole,  the  rate  of increase  in imports  fell from  11  .O per cent  in  1994  to  7.6 
per  cent  in  1995 to  5.2 per  cent  per  annum  in  1996.  In Japan,  the  rate  of growth  of imports  fell from 
13.6  per  cent  in  1994  to  3.5  per  cent  in  1996;  in the  US,  the  decline  from  1994  to  1996  was  from 
12.0  per  cent  to  6.4  per  cent;  and  in Europe,  from  9.1 per  cent  to  5.3 per  cent  for  the  same  period. 
As external  positions  deteriorated  , most  countries  responded  with  restrictive  policies  and  external 
imbalances  had  started  to  improve  in  1997  (cf. UNCTAD,  1997,:  Ch.  1). 
By historical  comparison,  the trade  deficits  were  not large. Ostrey  (1997)  points  out  that  they 
cannot  be  traced  to  “excessive  private  consumption.”  He  further  argues  that  there  is  “relatively 
strong”  evidence  in favour  of  the  long-term  “sustainability”  of  the  deficits  given  the  “strength  of 
savings  and  investment”  -  which  “implies  that  the  resources  needed  to  enlarge  future  productive 
capacity  are in place  and,  therefore,  that  rapid  economic  growth..  . is likely to persist.  In addition,  the 
allocation  of investment  appears  to  be efficient,  judging  from  the  strong  performance  of total  factor 
productivity  and  exports,  as well  as  the  absence  of  significant  relative  prices  distortions  in these 
economies.”  . . . “In addition,  both  the absence  of significant  exchange  rate misalignment  together  with 
relatively  open  trade  and  investment  regimes  have  tended  to  foster  diversification  of the  export  base 
in  the  ASEAN  countries,  making  the  trade  balance  less  sensitive  to  terms  of  trade  shocks,  and 
4 reducing  the  risks  associated  with  terms  of trade  shocks”  (Ostrey,  1997:  20-3).4  On this  reasoning, 
the  external  account  should  not  then  have  been  a cause  of crisis. 
Capital Flows 
The  other  side  of the  slowdown  of developed  country  imports  is an increase  in capital  flows 
from  the  developed  economies  into  the  Asian  economies  starting  in  1993-4.  This  was  further 
stimulated  by the  tightening  in monetary  policy  to  reduce  the deterioration  in the  foreign  balance  and 
by the  reaction  of international  investors  to  the  Tequila  crisis  in Latin  America.  There  was  a sharp 
increase  in the  proportion  of bank  lending  into  the  region,  representing  a radical  change  from  past 
experience. 
Capital  flows  require  both  a borrower  and  a  lender,  but  they  usually  are  arranged  by  an 
intermediary.  Thus,  in addition  to  the  fall in returns  in developed  countries  that  led  to  a search  for 
higher  returns  in emerging  markets,  was the fact that global  investment  banks  were  seeking  alternative 
sources  of revenue  to help them  emerge  from  their  difficulties  in the US in the  1980s.  One  ofthe  ways 
that  they  could  do this was  by earning  fee and commission  income  by arranging  structured  derivative 
packages  which  allowed  emerging  market  borrowers  access  to  funds  at low  interest  rates  prevailing 
in  developed  country  markets,  while  offering  to  developed  country  investors  assets  earning  high 
emerging  market  interest  rates.  A popular  means  of arranging  lending  was  by means  of equity  swaps 
in which  high-yielding  debt issued  by emerging  market  firms or banks was repackaged  into  investment 
trust  vehicles  which  could  be  sold  to  institutional  investors  in developing  countries  as if they  were 
investment-grade  assets.  Although  the  technical  aspects  of  these  packages  are  complicated,  they 
almost  all depend  on the  stability  of exchange  rates,  since  the  exchange  rate  risk  is borne  not  by the 
underwriting  bank,  but  by the  buyer  or the  seller.5 
Financial  liberalisation  also  made  it possible  for  financial  institutions  in emerging  economies 
4  While  Ostrey  (1997) notes that any external  deficit represents a potential risk in the case of external  shocks, it points 
out that deficits in the  1980s had been much higher  without  generating  diffkulty. 
5  It is for this reason  that when the Thai baht devalued,  it represented  a major event,  since all contracts  which 
had been purchased  on the high probability  of exchange  rate stability automatically  changed  in value,  and 
frequently  passed from positive  to negative  vahtes,  leading  investors  to sell them,  which was the equivalent  of 
withdrawing  capital from the Asian economies. 
5 to  increase  their  role  as intermediaries.  The  issue  of  bonds  by  Asian  entities  increased  from  $25.3 
billion  in  1995  to  $43.1  billion  in  1996.  Korea  entities  alone  accounted  for  $16  billion,  and  Hong 
Kong,  Indonesia  and  Thailand  raised  about  $4 billion  each  (IMP,  1997b:  77).  Many  of these  bonds 
served  as the  basis  for  derivatives  contracts  (discussed  above)  and  were  intermediated  by off-shore 
investment  funds.‘j  The  result  was  a  sharp  increase  in  foreign  exchange  reserves,  which  further 
strengthened  expectations  of exchange  rate  stability.’ 
The  increase  in capital  inflows  produced  a sharp  increase  in foreign  exchange  reserves,  which 
further  strengthened  expectations  of exchange  rate  stability.  However,  as central  banks  attempted  to 
keep  their  currencies  from  appreciating  relative  to the dollar,  the rise in foreign  exchange  reserves  was 
translated  into  increased  liquidity  for the  domestic  banking  sector  and in expanded  domestic  lending. 
Exchange  Rate  Misalignments 
However,  this  attempt  to  keep  exchange  rates  stable  to  prevent  loss  of competitiveness  was 
only  partially  successful  since  the  dollar  was  itselfon  a strengthening  path  from  the  end  of  1995,  but 
this  only  started  to  become  visible  in real  exchange  rate  appreciations  in a number  of countries  from 
1996.  For  example,  the  &IF’s  Expanded  Competitiveness  Indicators  System  (Turner  and  Golub, 
1997) reports  that  Indonesia’s  real effective  exchange  rate  (the  exchange  rate  of the  rupiah  corrected 
for  changes  in costs  and  prices  in Indonesia  relative  to  its trading  partners,  weighted  by the  amount 
of Indonesian  trade  with  each  trading  partner),  marginally  depreciated  from  1990 to  1994, and  only 
regained  its  1990  level  by  1995.  In  Thailand,  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  in  1994 was  the  same 
as in  1990  and  rose  only  marginally  in  1995.  In Korea,  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  depreciated 
substantially  from  1990 to  1993,  and  remained  at a roughly  constant  level  until  1995.  Malaysia  and 
Singapore  show  marginal  rises from  1990 to  1992, and then  stability  thereafter.  Only Hong  Kong  and 
the  Philippines  show  substantial  and  sustained  declines  in competitiveness  due  to  real exchange  rate 
appreciation  over  the  period  1990-95.  This  study  supports  the  conclusion  of  the  absence  of 
6  For example, according  to the Korean Securities Supervisory  Board. 28 Korean  securities houses operated  over  100 
funds with assets of nearly  $3 billion  located in Malaysia,  Ireland  and France.  Investment  banks were also active in 
operating  offshore funds. Roughly two-thirds  of the assets of these funds were in Korean  companies.  The losses of these 
funds are estimated  at over $1 billion.  Cf. Korean  Times,  19 February  1998. 
6 substantial  exchange  rate  readjustment  cited  above.’ 
Domestic Banks  and Domestic  Credit Expansion 
Throughout  this  period,  Asian  countries  were  under  pressure  from  both  the  IMP  and  the 
WTO  to  modernise,  liberal&e and  deregulate  their  banking  and  financial  systems.  In  1993,  Thailand 
created  the  Offshore  International  Banking  Facility.  The  Bank  for  International  Settlements  (BIS) 
notes  that  its  existence  “was  an important  reason  for  the  upsurge  in cross-border  inter-bank  credit 
to  Thailand’  (BIS,  1995:  19)* in  1994.’  Ostrey  (1997:  20-21)  notes  that  “in Thailand,  risk-weighted 
capital-asset  ratios  were  increased  for  both  commercial  banks  and  finance  companies  in  order  to 
comply  with  BIS  standards,  and  now  approach  10 per  cent  for  local  banks.  In  addition,  required 
provisions  for  doubtful  assets  were  increased,  and  limits  on  banks’  net  open  foreign  exchange 
positions  were tightened.  While banks  have been  successful  in broadly  matching  the maturity  structure 
of  their  assets  and  liabilities,  rapid  growth  in  foreign  exchange  lending  has  nevertheless  created 
concerns  of  increased  foreign  exchange  risk.  In  Malaysia,  the  position  of  the  banking  system  has 
strengthened  in recent  years.”  In the beginning  of 1994, Korea  initiated  the  conversion  of short-term 
finance  companies  into  investment  banks,  as part  of  an attempt  to  introduce  features  of developed 
countries’  financial  system  such  as commercial  paper  markets  and  investment  banking,  such  as the 
creation  of offshore  investment  funds  that  were  the  major  vehicles  for the  sale of derivative  products 
7  Since the Mexican  crisis the lMF has produced  a number  of studies attempting  to identify  indicators  of future 
exchange  rate and banking  crises. The indicator  which appears  as significative  in all of them is real appreciation  of 
the exchange  rate, which the lMF studies cited above suggest was not a major factor  in Asia. 
The commentary  refers to flows in 1994. The report also notes that “tight monetary  conditions  help to explain 
the large banking  inflows  into South Korea.”  An IMF Working  Paper (Johnson,  Darbar  and Echeverria,  1997: 38) 
notes that “net private  capital inflows were larger  as a percentage  of GDP in Thailand  than  in the other  countries 
and a large part  of these inflows through  the international  banking  facility were short term  in nature,  which  may 
have increased  Thailand’s  vulnerability  to a reversal  of such flows.” 
’  The  1996/97 AnnualReport  (MS,  1997: 112-3) noted that “the difficulties  of Thailand’s  banking  system can be 
traced in part to the creation.  . . of the Bangkok  International  Banking  Facilities  (BlBF), which,  as well as promoting 
Bangkok  as an international  financial  centre,  allowed local banks to borrow in dollars..  . . The Bank of Thailand  has 
taken a number of measures to limit the growth of the BlBF on lending to the domestic market.  From September  1995 
local  banks’  net foreign  exchange  liabilities  were  made  subject to ceilings  (e.g. 20 per cent  of assets)  In addition. 
foreign  deposits were excludedfromthe  calculation  ofthe  statutory loan-to-deposit  ratios that banks have to maintain.” 
7 ofKorean  banks  a.nd corporations.  These  effectively  created  a commercial  paper  market  and provided 
new  sources  of foreign  borrowing. 
An  IMF  Working  Paper  (Montgomery,  1997:25,  19)  notes  the  completion  of  the 
modernisation  of the  Indonesian  banking  system.  It cautions  that  the  basic  problem  is no  longer  the 
absence  of  appropriate  regulation,  but  the  supervision  of the  banks  to  ensure  that  regulations  are 
respected,  especially  with  respect  to  the  rapid  expansion  of real estate  lending,  and  to  the  reliability 
of the  figures  on bank  capital  adequacy.  The  paper  also reports  that the ratio  of net  foreign  exchange 
liabilities  to  bank  equity  reached  a high  of  161 per  cent  in  1992/3,  but  had  fallen  back  to  little  over 
100 per  cent  in  1994/5. 
These  and  other  types  of liberalisation  throughout  the  region  provided  a fertile  ground  for the 
inflows  of foreign  investors’  funds,  which  multilateral  agencies  such as the OECD  and the  IMF  were 
actively  encouraging.  However,  given  the  high  savings  rates  in  most  Asian  countries,  and  the 
preponderance  of  foreign  direct  investment  flows  (FDI,  foreign  companies’  direct  investments  in 
productive  capacity)  in others,  and  the  relative  absence  of demands  for  consumption  finance,  bank 
lending  was  directed  primarily  into  two  areas.”  One  was  in providing  loans  to  domestic  f%ms, using 
the  supply  of  cheaper  foreign  fUnds to  offer  interest  rates  below  domestic  rates.  The  other  was  to 
finance  non-manufacturing  initiatives,  such  as financial  services,  real-estate  investments,  and  other 
types  of infrastructure  investment  that previously  had been  rationed  by government  policies  directing 
credit  towards  export-oriented  manufacturing  industries.  With  rates  of growth  averaging  S-10  per 
cent,  and  given  the  increasing  importance  of the  globalisation  of production  in Asia,  it was  relatively 
easy for bankers  to just@  ticing  the rapidly  expanding  needs  for new  office  space,  leisure  centres, 
golf  courses  and  recreational  residences.  The  exceptional  returns  that  they  expected  on  such 
investment  could,  of  course,  only  be  justified  on  the  basis  of  continued  global  expansion. 
lo  Composition of Bank Loans, 1993 (percentages) 
East Asia  Home Mortgages  Consumer Credit  Enterprises  Government 
Indonesia  4.1  6.9  70.7  2.2 
Korea  12.7  11.7  74.5  1.1 
Malaysia  13.9  11.2  30.1  0.5 
Thailand  8.3  4.1  58.8  0.7 
Source: BIS, 1998: 40 
8 Unfortunately,  it was  coming  to  an end. 
Asia is not Mexico 
Thus, unlike  Mexico,  it is impossible  to  argue  that  excessive  domestic  bank  lending  and real 
exchange  rate  appreciation  led  to  a  consumption  and  import  boom  which  eventually  created  an 
expanding  foreign  deficit  that  speculators  recognised  as unsustainable  since  both  the  real  exchange 
rate  appreciations  and  the  increased  domestic  bank  lending  occurred  well  after  the  beginning  of the 
decline  in trade  balances  and the increase  in foreign  bank  lending.  Rather,  the  process  appears  to have 
been  the  opposite.  It was  the  rise  in short-term  bank  inflows  and  the  decline  in developed  country 
demand  in the  presence  of liberalisation  of domestic  financial  markets  that  led to  the  deterioration  in 
the trade  balance,  which  was then  further  aggravated  by dollar  appreciation  and rapid  domestic  credit 
expansion.  It is for this  reason  that  the  crisis was  not  a foreign  exchange  crisis  caused  by a payments 
imbalance,  since  there  was  no  clear  evidence  that  exchange  rates  were  inappropriate.  Reserves  were 
extremely  large, l1 external  balances  were  moving  in  the  right  direction  and  official  international 
agency  assessments  of country  fundamentals  suggested  that  the  external  positions  were  sustainable 
at existing  exchange  rates. 
The Beginning  of the Crisis 
The  crisis  broke  at the  weakest  link  in the  Asian  economies,  i.e.  the  recently  liberalised  and 
deregulated  private  domestic  banking  systems.  Weakness  in the  financial  sector  in Indonesia  was 
evidenced  by its first  private  bank  failure in 20 years  in  1992,  and the  rescue  of a major  state  bank  in 
1995 (Montgomery,  1997:  13). In Thailand,  where  the  expansion  of the  banking  sector  had  been  the 
l1  According  to the IMF (1997: 64), emerging  economies accumulated  US$575 billion  in reserves between  1990 and 
1996, representing  49 per cent of the total flows; US$202.2 billion were to the Asian region, but onlyUS$76.4  billion 
were to Asia excluding  India and China  (Cf. IMF,  1997: 197-8). However,  they are concentrated  in China,  Taiwan, 
Singapore  and Hong Kong.  Thailand’s  reserves  increased  by US$27 billion,  and Singapore’s  by US%56  billion  over 
the period. 
9 most rapid,12  the  central  bank  had  since  1996  been  practising  a policy  of “forbearance”  (frequently 
used  by developed  country  central  banks,  in particular  the  Federal  Reserve),  that  is,  central  banks 
lending  to  support  banks  in difficulty  in the  hope  that  they  can be rescued  without  public  notice  and 
without  creating  market  panic.  Given the degree  to which  Thai banks  and finance  companies  had been 
financed  through  foreign  currency  lending  to its new  offshore  banking  centre,  this meant  using  foreign 
exchange  reserves  for  its internal  function  of lender  of last resort.  A similar  process  appears  to  have 
been  at work  in Korea  from  the  spring  of  1996.  However,  in Korea,  the  first  signs  of difIiculty  were 
in a run ofbankruptcies  starting  withHanbo  steel in January  1997. But,  despite  increasing  information 
(for  example,  from  international  rating  agencies)  of  difficulties  in  Asian  banks,  a  Thai  land 
development  company  failing to meet  a foreign  debt  payment,  and numerous  bankruptcies  in Korean 
corporations,  foreign  capital  inflows  into  Asia  continued  unabated  during  the  first  half  of  1997. 
But  the  failure  by the  Bank  of Thailand  to  arrange  the  rescue  of the  country’s  largest  finance 
company,  Finance  One, in the  Spring  of  1997 concentrated  the  attention  of international  lenders  and 
the  feared  reversal  of  short-term  lending  started.  The  failure  took  on  special  importance  because  it 
occurred  against  the background  of increased  uncertainty  in international  capital  markets  concerning 
the  evolution  of international  interest  rate  differentials.  In the  beginning  of May  1997,  the  view  that 
the  Japanese  economy  was  engaged  in a full-fledged  recovery  gained  increasing  support  (although 
there  was  virtually  no hard  evidence  to  support  this belief)  and there  was  a sharp  appreciation  of the 
yen  and  a sudden  rise  in Japanese  short-term  interest  rates  on  expectations  that  the  Bank  of Japan 
would  move  quickly  to  raise  its  discount  rate. l3 As  a result,  funds  that  had  been  borrowed  at  low 
interest  rates  in Japan  and Hong  Kong,  and invested  at substantially  higher  rates  in Asia,  were  quickly 
l2  Bank assets as a percentage of GDP for three Southeast Asian countries, 1989-1994 (percentages) 
Bank Assets/GDP  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Indonesia  49.3  60.5  64.2  63.0  58.8  57.3 
Malaysia  92.4  96.0  101.9  95.0  92.9  99.9 
Thailand  72.7  79.2  82.2  85.0  94.6  109.5 
Source: Montgomery,  1997,::;  Table  1, p. 7. 
l3  The move was all the more important  because it “was of a magnitude  that market participants  considered  quite 
unlikely,  even as late as 5 May. As the yen appreciated  rapidly between  5 May and 9 May (the market)  began  to 
reflect  a significant  probability  of large further  appreciations”  (IMF, November  1997: 19). 
10 withdrawn  and  returned  to  Japan,  supporting  the  appreciation  of  the  yen  and  putting  increasing 
pressure  on  Asian  reserves  and  exchange  rates. 
The  Thai  financial  crisis  could  not  have  avoided  becoming  an exchange  rate crisis, given  the 
degree  to which  foreign  reserves  had  already  been  used  to  shore  up banks  through  the  “lender  of last 
resort”  tinction  and the  fact  that  the  reserves  were  not  nearly sufficient to  meet  the  liquidation  of the 
entire  amount  of foreign  lending  while  the foreign  balance  was continuing  to deteriorate.  A domestic 
banking  crisis,  which  could  have  been  handled  by  the  central  bank  through  creation  of  domestic 
currency  in a relatively  closed  capital  market,  became  a foreign  exchange  crisis  because  of the  open 
capital  market  and the  size of foreign  capital  inflows into the  Thai banking  system  through  the  BIBF. 
Since the  Bank  of Thailand  could  not  print  dollars,  it could  not  act  as lender  of last resort  to its own 
domestic  banks’  exposure  in US  dollars  and  its use  of its foreign  exchange  reserves  to  do  so  made 
it helpless  to  support  the  exchange  rate.14 
Thus,  even  though  Thailand  had  a savings  ratio  of  around  40  per  cent,  foreign  exchange 
reserves  that  were  three  times  the  1996  current  account  deficit,  and  import  growth  as  well  as 
domestic  consumption  were  slowing,  and  a predominance  of long-term  capital  inflows,  the  baht  was 
allowed  to  float  on  2 July and  the  IMF was  called in at the  end  of the  month  to  formulate  a bail out. 
A Financial  Crisis  of International  Capital  Market  Failure 
The  crisis  could  thus  be explained  as a case  of “market  failure”  of two  different  types.  First, 
a failure  of free,  competitive  international  capital  markets  to produce  the  optimal  allocation  of capital. 
14  Although  it did operate actively  in the forward  market for baht,  employing  the technique  of the bear  squeeze 
(first employed  in Berlin  in the  19* century  and by Poincart! in the famous  stabilisation  of the French  franc,  see 
Einzig,  1937) to try to support the exchange  rate. The Bank bought baht from speculators  for exchange  at a future 
date at an exchange  rate determined  by the relative  interest  costs of lending  baht for the period.  At the f&ure 
expiry  date of the contract  the speculator  had to sell baht to the Bank at the previously  agreed price.  If the baht  had 
devalued  by the fnture  date, then the speculator  could purchase  in the market the baht he had to sell to the bank  at 
a lower dollar price  than that he would receive,  the difference  representing  speculative  profit.  In a bear  squeeze the 
Bank makes it as difficult  as possible for speculators  to buy the baht that they have to deliver by restricting  the 
banks’  sale of baht to speculators  in the offshore  markets.  The speculators  thus have to borrow  the baht at 
extremely  high rates  (rates when as high as 1,300 per cent) to honour  their  contracts  and take a loss. It is estimated 
(IMF,  1997b: 35) that  speculators  lost as much  as $1.5 billion  in the bear squeeze applied by the Bank of Thailand 
through  the beginning  of July. The problem  with such a policy is that the central  bank has to have enough  foreign 
exchange  to meet the forward  sales of baht coming  due until  speculation  is stemmed. 
11 Funds  continued  to  flow to Asian  financial  institutions  after  it was  clear  that  financial  instability  was 
widespread.  In the  words  of Alan  Greenspan:  “In retrospect,  it is clear  that  more  investment  monies 
flowed  into  these  economies  than  could  be profitably  employed  at modest  risk’  (Greenspan,  1997: 
l-2).  Second,  a failure  of privatised  free-market  “banking  systems,  [that]  were  not  up  to  the  task 
of effectively  absorbing  and  channelling  to productive  use  large  foreign  capital  inflows  as well  as the 
large  amount  of  domestic  savings  these  economies”.  . . . “Such  weakness  led  to  the  misallocation  of 
resources”  (Hoi-mats,  1997:  1).  On the  other  hand,  Stanley  Fischer  notes  that  “the  maintenance  of 
pegged  exchange  rate  regimes  for  too  long..  . encouraged  external  borrowing  and  led  to  excessive 
exposure  to  foreign  exchange  risk”  (Fischer,  1998:  2). -  which  suggests  that  international  bankers 
and  businessmen  are  incapable  of identifying  exchange  rate  misalignments.‘s 
The  rapid  deterioration  in conditions  in Thailand  -  especially  the  change  in exchange  rate 
policy,  led  to  substantial  losses  for  foreign  investors  who  had  presumed  that  the  probability  of 
exchange  depreciation  was negligible-led  to a reassessment  of investors’  expectations  for exchange 
rate  adjusted  returns  on their  investments  in the  rest  of the  region.  Speculators,  having  succeeded  in 
Thailand,  started  to  look  for  other  possible  candidates  for  depreciation. 
The  balance  of  payments  deficit  in the  Philippines  had  been  increasing  for  some  years  and 
attention  quickly  shifted  to  the  exchange  rate  of  the  peso.  The  central  bank  responded  with  an 
increase  in the  overnight  interest  rate  from  15 per  cent  to  24 per  cent  and the  discount  rate  to 32 per 
cent,  but  under  pressure,  the  peso  was  allowed  to  float  within  a fluctuation  band  on  11 July.  Once 
the  peso  had  fallen,  it was  clear that  every  country  in the  region  was  a potential  target.  Malaysia  had 
the  next  worst  balance  of  payments  position,  and  its  foreign  borrowing  from  banks  had  been 
increasing  rapidly.  Although  steps  had  already  been  taken  in March  1997  to  reduce  exposure  of 
financial  institutions  to real estate  and financial  investments,  Malaysia  quickly  followed  the Philippines 
ls  As presumably  are part  of the IMF Research  Department,  cf.  Ostrey,  opcit.,1997,  quoted  above.  See also IMF 
(1997b: 69): “Among  currencies  not  affected  by the contagion  was the Korean  won, even though  there  were many 
parallels  in economic  circumstance  with Thailand..  . observers have noted that this was perhaps because Korea’s  debt 
levels were lower, because the substantial  depreciation  of the won during the last year and a half had left it at a more 
appropriate  level,  or because  the  recent  appreciations  of the  yen  would  have  greater  benefits  for  Korea  than  its 
neighbours. While these factors may have played a role, it should be noted that unlike..  . the Asian economies  that were 
attacked,  Korea  restricts  won credit to foreign  residents,  and the foreign  exchange  markets,  particularly  the foreign 
exchange  market,  are underdeveloped.  Simply put, this makes it difficult  for foreign  investors  to speculate  against the 
won. 
12 and allowed  the ringgit  to float on 14 July.  Singapore  followed  on the  17 July, allowing  a depreciation 
of the  Singapore  dollar,  and  although  Indonesia  had also tightened  monetary  policy  in an attempt  to 
support its currency,  once  Malaysia  and Singapore  had given  up the  dollar  peg,  Indonesia  introduced 
enlarged  fluctuation  bands  on  21  July.  Thus,  in  the  space  of  less  than  three  weeks,  Thailand, 
Philippines,  Malaysia,  Singapore  and Indonesia  gave  up  exchange  rates  that  had  been  stable  against 
the  dollar  for  extended  periods. 
Had  it been  a typical  Bretton  Woods  balance  of payments  crisis,  it should  have  been  over  at 
this point;  tight  monetary  and fiscal policy  would  have  reduced  imports  and increased  the  demand  for 
domestic  assets,  while  the  currency  depreciations  should  have  increased  exports.  The  balance  of 
falling  imports,  rising  exports  and increased  demand  for domestic  assets  due to high interest  rates  and 
expectation  of  subsequent  appreciation  should  have  brought  equilibrium  to  the  foreign  currency 
markets  and,  following  the  Mexican  example,  after  a period  of high  inflation,  growth  and  currency 
stability  should  have  resumed.  With  an average  of around  15 per  cent  of GDP  in bad  loans,  it would 
have  ranked  on  the  high  side  of  recent  financial  crises,  but  not  out  of  the  range  of  Mexico  and 
Venezuela,  and  much  lower  than  Chile.  This  was  clearly  the  expectation  of  the  IMP  and  most 
international  observers.  However,  the  move  to  floating  exchange  rates  did  not  bring  stability,  but 
instead  brought  increased  pressure.  The  reason,  as  noted  above,  was  that  this  was  not  a typical 
balance  of payments  crisis,  but  a financial  crisis. 
Contagion  and  Capital  Flows 
As  exchange  rates  continued  to  fall, it became  clear  that  what  had  been  a relatively  stable 
process  of  adjusting  trading  patterns  without  sectoral  adjustment  crises  would  be  permanently 
disrupted.  As a result,  Taiwan,  even  though  it had  a massive  trade  surplus,  massive  foreign  exchange 
reserves,  a budget  surplus,  and no visible  speculative  pressure  on its exchange  rate  decided  to recover 
its relative  competitive  position  in the  region  and devalued  its currency  by  10 per cent on  17 October. 
This  quickly  extended  the  crisis  from  Southeast  Asia  to  Northeast  Asia  and  the  first-tier  NICs.  It 
suggested  difficulty  in  even  the  strongest  of the  Asian  economies.  Given  the  pivotal  role  of  Hong 
Kong  between  Taiwan  and China  and its recent  change  to  special  administrative  region  status  under 
13 Chinese  control,  the  result  of the  devaluation  in Taiwan  was  to  raise the  possibility  of a devaluation 
of the  Hong  Kong  dollar,  or  even  the  Chinese  renminbi.16 
Given that  the  Hong  Kong  dollar  was  one  of the  few  currencies  in the  region  showing  clear 
evidence  of overvaluation  and a deteriorating  external  balance,  there  was an instant  flight  of investors. 
The  fact that  the  Special  Province  operated  a Currency  Board,  in which  domestic  currency  is 100  per 
cent  backed  by foreign  exchange  reserves,  may  have  contributed  to  the  panic.  An  investor  in Hong 
Kong  now  ran  a risk  of  a depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  or  of  a collapse  of  the  prices  of  his 
financial  assets,  or both.  The  depreciation  of virtually  every  other  currency  in the  region  suggested 
that  there  would  be pressure  on  competitiveness  and  thus  on the  exchange  rate.  But,  the  operation 
of the  Currency  Board  meant  that  even  if the  defence  of the  exchange  rate  were  successtil,  this  in 
itself  would  have  negative  impact  on  equity  prices,  for  even  if the  Board  did  not  run  out  of  US 
dollars,  by  selling  dollars  against  HK  dollars,  it would  sharply  reduce  the  domestic  money  supply, 
producing  a  sharp  increase  in  interest  rates,  and  internal  deflation,  which  would  certainly  create 
difficulty  for  domestic  banks  and  property  companies  that  were  primarily  involved  in  real  estate 
lending  and  other  financial  ventures.  Thus,  even  if the  exchange  rate  held,  in  doing  so,  it  would 
certainly  bring  about  a collapse  in the  stock  market.  The  obvious,  safe  course  of action  for  a foreign 
investor  facing  this  choice  was  to  sell both  the  Hong  Kong  market  and  the  Hong  Kong  dollar.  The 
market  was  already  under  pressure  in August  and  September,  but  fell 6 per  cent  on  22 October  and 
another  10 per  cent  on  23  October,  after  the  Taiwanese  depreciation.  As  a result  of  sales  of  Hong 
Kong  dollars,  overnight  interest  rates  rose  from  7 per  cent  to  300  per  cent  and  suggested  that  the 
domestic  costs  of  exchange  rate  stability  would  be  very  large.  Since  a devaluation  in Hong  Kong 
would  certainly  have  meant  a devaluation  ofthe  Chinese  currency,  this would  have ushered  in a series 
of beggar-my-neighbour  devaluations  reminiscent  of the  currency  instability  of the  1920s  and  193 OS 
which  led to the Great Depression.  Faced  with  this  prospect,  the New  York  financial  markets  led the 
rest  of the  world’s  developed  equity  markets  in a record  absolute  collapse  on  27  October  1997. 
Despite  the  bankruptcies  of  large  manufacturing  conglomerates  (chaebols)  and  increasing 
concern  for  the  Korean  banks  that  had  lent  to  these  firms,  given  that  many  of the  chaebols  carried 
l6 Fred Bergsten  (1997) has suggested that the Taiwanese  move, which came on the eve of Jiang Zemin’s visit to the 
US, was made in order to embarrass  China. 
14 leverage  ratios  in excess  of 500 per cent (i.e. borrowed  funds  were  five times  owner’s  equity  capital), 
markets  continued  to  treat  these  as  purely  internal  difficulties.  Korean  bank  credit  ratings  were 
reduced  in August,  but it was  only  after  the  global  equity  market  collapses  at the  end  of October  that 
markets  focussed  on the viability  of the  Korean  producers  in conditions  of global  depression.  Given 
the  exchange  rate  changes  in  the  region,  the  Korean  currency  was  now  clearly  overvalued,  its 
production  was  heavily  concentrated  in semiconductors  (whose  price  had  fallen  from  around  US$50 
per  chip  to  US$5  in less than  two  years),  and it was  attempting  to further  expand  in the  international 
automobile  market  where  excess  capacity  dominated.  Finally,  its  current  account  had  been 
deteriorating  rapidly. 
This would  have  been  enough  to raise the  concerns  of international  investors,  but  at the  same 
time,  a series  of  Japanese  bank  bankruptcies  occurred.  Since  the  largest  proportion  of  lending  to 
Korea  was  from  Japan,  it was  feared  that  they  would  recall  their  loans  to  Korean  conglomerates, 
forcing  more  bankruptcies  in Korea.  The  country  thus  experienced  the  same  withdrawal  of foreign 
lending  which  had  been  occurring  in the  rest  of the  Asian  region  since  the  summer. 
In November,  it became  clear that  the Bank  of Korea  had for some  time  been  using  its foreign 
exchange  reserves  for lender  of last resort  lending  to  domestic  banks  unable  to  roll  over  their  foreign 
borrowing.  It  also  emerged  that  the  level  of  short-term  foreign  lending  was  much  higher  than  had 
been  presumed.  Thus,  with  around  US$6  billion  in foreign  reserves  and  around  US$lOO  billion  of 
lending  to  be repaid  to foreign  lenders,  the  Bank  of Korea  allowed  the  won  to  float,  and  it went  into 
free  fall, much  as the  other  currencies  in the  region,  and  the  IMF  was  called  in to  provide  support. 
Given  that  Japanese  banks  were  the largest  lenders  in the region,  and had substantial  exposure 
to increasingly  shaky  Korean  companies,  the  collapse  of the won  created  panic  in Japan  and the  Bank 
of Japan  had to  inject  some US$23  billion  into  the banking  system  on 29 November  to keep  the  inter- 
bank  money  market  from  collapsing  as Japanese  banks  withdrew  credit,  even  from  other  Japanese 
banks.  The  rise in the  yen  which  had  started  in the  Spring  was  thus  reversed  and  it started  to  weaken 
against  the  dollar  during  November  1997. 
15 Table  1  External  Financing  of Korea,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines  and  Thailand 
Five  Asian  Economies 
Current  Account  Balance  -24.6  -41.3  -54.9  -26.0  17.6 
Net  External  Financing  47.4  80.9  92.8  15.2  15.2 
-  Direct  Equity  Flows  4.7  4.9  7.0  7.2  9.8 
-  Portfolio  Flows  7.6  10.6  12.1  -11.6  -1.9 
-  Commercial  Bank  Lending  24.0  49.5  55.5  -21.3  -14.1 
-  Non-Bank  Private  Lending  4.2  12.4  18.4  13.7  -3.3 
Net  Official  Flows  7.0  3.6  -0.2  27.2  24.6 
Reserves  (- = increase)  -5.4  -13.7  -18.3  22.7  -27.1 
1994  1995  1996  1997”  1  998b 
Notes:  a =  estimate,  b = forecast 
Source:  Institute  of International  Finance,  29,  January  1998:  2. 
This  closed  the  first  phase  of the  crisis,  with  Thailand,  Indonesia  and  Korea  accepting  IMF 
conditional  lending,  and  a  number  of  other  countries  such  as Malaysia,  Hong  Kong  and  Taiwan 
introducing  similar  policies  independently  of any  international  commitment  of funds.  Table  1 gives 
evidence  of why  these  measures  have  been  unable  to reintroduce  currency  stability  in the  region.  The 
withdrawal  of  commercial  bank  lending,  plus  current  account  financing  and  the  sale  of  portfolio 
equity  total  US  $58.9  billion,  over  two-thirds  of the  accumulation  of reserves  over  the  period  1990- 
96  of  US$76.2  billion.  In  one  year  (in  fact,  since  the  outflows  only  started  in  earnest  in  July,  the 
relevant  period  is closer  to  six months),  the  region  was  called  upon  to  reimburse  lending  and  make 
current  payments  equal  to  the  accumulated  reserves  of the  previous  seven  years.  This  is equivalent 
to  a massive  “bank  run”  on  the  region,  without  any lender  of last  resort.  Just  as no  bank  can  ever 
repay  all  its  deposits  at  sight,  no  country  which  is  open  to  international  capital  flows  can  repay 
virtually  all of its short-term  borrowing  instantaneously  without  a collapse  in the  exchange  rate  and 
substantial  disruption  of the  real  economy.  It is for  this  reason  that  the  basic  problem  in the  region 
was  not  mistaken  domestic  policy,  or fundamental  disequilibrium,  nor  even  lack  of transparency  in 
the  banking  sector,  although  there  is no question  that  weakness  in the banking  sectors  of many  of the 
countries  aggravated  the  crisis,  but  was  primarily  caused  by the  reversal  of the  excessively  rapid  rise 
in capital  inflows  and  the  fall in global  demand. 
Indeed,  these  are  simply  two  sides  of  the  same  coin,  excess  saving  on  the  part  of  the 
16 developing  world  outside  the  US,  visible  in the  form  of  capital  flows  into  the  region,  meant  that 
domestic  investment  was  increasingly  substituted  for  export  sales.  This  may  be  called  an  excess 
savings  crisis.  Or an over-investment  crisis, which,  in a way  similar to Japan  has caused  massive  over- 
investment  and  over-capacity  which  will produce  downward  pressure  on the  prices  of traded  goods 
and  thus  deterioration  in the  terms  of trade  of these  countries.  Indeed,  it is ironic  to  recall  that  at the 
beginning  of  the  1990s  most  official  institutions  were  announcing  that  it  would  be  a  decade  of 
savings  shortage  as the  demand  for capital  by developing  countries  outstripped  the  supply  of savings, 
and  that  high  real interest  rates  would  be the  natural  result.  Less  than  half-way  through  the  decade, 
there  is instead  massive  excess  capacity,  a risk  of a global  glut  of production.  Yet,  high  real  interest 
rates  seem  still to  be  considered  the  answer  to  the  crisis. 
Table  2: Asian  Countries:  Investment  as Percentage  of  GDP,  1986- 1995 
1991-5  1986-90 
Singapore  34.1  32.4 
Malaysia  39.1  23.4 
Indonesia  27.2  26.3 
Thailand  41.1  33.0 
Philippines  22.2  19.0 
Korea  37.4  31.9 
China  35.3  27.8 
Source:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  data  from  Asian  Development  Bank:  Key  Indicators  of 
Developing  Asian  and  Pacific  Countries. 
Stage  Two:  The Cure  is  Worse  than  the Disease 
The  second  stage  of the  crisis  came  in the  policy  response,  largely  based  on  the  conditional 
lending  by the  IMF.  The  IMP  also  mistook  the  crisis  for  traditional  balance  of payments  crisis  and 
applied  the  same  measures  that  they  had  used  with  modest  success  in  the  Tequila  crisis.  These 
involved  increasing  interest  rates  to  restore  confidence  in  the  currency,  tightening  government 
budgets  to  slow  demand  for  imports,  control  of monetary  aggregates  to  keep  the  rate  of  inflation 
from  eroding  the benefits  to export  competitiveness  of devaluation  and reform  ofthe  banking  system 
The  idea  was  basically  to  put  household  and bank  balance  sheets  back  in balance  and  to  allow  firms 
to  create  an export  surplus.  However,  as noted  above,  the  collapse  of  exchange  rates  had  not  been 
17 due to banks  financing  excess  demand  for imported  consumption  goods,  but rather,  financing  imports 
of  capital  goods  by firms.  It was  the  firms’  balance  sheets  that  were  generally  at risk.  And  the  IMF 
conditions  only  made  their  positions  worse.  First,  the  flight  of foreign  capital  meant  that  they  had  to 
replace  their  short-term  financing,  but  at  sharply  higher  rates  from  domestic  banks.  Second,  with 
falling global  demand,  firms became  increasingly  dependent  on domestic  demand,  but fiscal policy  was 
ensuring  that  demand  would  be falling.  Thus,  firms  had  rising  short-term  financing  costs  and  falling 
income  flows  to  meet  them.  Third,  firms  that  had  borrowed  abroad  had  to  repay  foreign  lenders. 
Given  the  long  period  of  relatively  stable  exchange  rates,  much  of  this  borrowing  had  not  been 
hedged,  and thus  had  to be repaid  in foreign  currency.  But,  export  receipts  were  falling  and  the  value 
in domestic  currency  was  rising  daily.  All three  of these  factors  meant  that  firms  went  from  being  in 
a position  of  illiquidity,  i.e.  of  not  being  able  to  convert  their  assets  into  foreign  currency  quickly 
enough,  to  positions  of insolvency,  i.e.  of having  the  value  of their  assets  fall below  their  liabilities. 
That  is,  they  were  technically  bankrupt.  At  the  same  time,  domestic  banks  that  had  acted  as 
intermediaries,  borrowing  foreign  currency  to  lend  to  domestic  firms  found  themselves  in the  same 
position.  But,  their  position  was  aggravated  by the  fact that  if they  charged  higher  interest  rates,  this 
simply  made  it more  likely  that  their  clients  would  go bankrupt  and be unable  to repay  anything.  The 
dispute  with  the  IMF  was  thus  over  the  impact  of interest  rate  policy.  The  IMF  wanted  rates  set  at 
levels  that  were  high  enough  to  generate  demand  for  domestic  currency,  while  the  firms and  banks 
and most  affected  Asian  governments  wanted  interest  rates  set low  enough  to  allow  firms  and  banks 
to  make  their  payment  commitments. 
Given the fact that  the  only way that  firms  and banks  could  escape  bankruptcy  was by repaying 
their  foreign  currency  loans  as fast as possible,  this  set in train  what  Hyman  Minsky,  following  Irving 
Fisher,  has  called  a debt  deflation  process.  In  order  to  meet  their  current  commitments,  a firms  are 
firm  is forced  to  sell assets,  inventory,  current  output,  anything  that  will  prevent  it from  having  to 
close  its books  as a bankrupt.  But  this  is a self defeating  process,  for  as they  increase  supply,  they 
drive  down  the  price  of the  assets  they  are trying  to sell, reducing  their  ability to  liquidate  their  assets 
for  a value  that  will  cover  their  commitments.  For  Asian  firms,  the  proceeds  of the  sales  reduced 
domestic  asset  prices,  while  their  demand  for  foreign  currency  drove  up  its  price,  thus  driving  the 
terms  of trade  against  them.  In  such  conditions,  there  is no interest  rate  high  enough  to  stop  the  sale 
18 of  domestic  investments  and the  sale of the  domestic  currency.  Indeed,  high  interest  rates  only  make 
the  process  worse.  As  firms and  banks  scrambled  to  save  themselves  from  bankruptcy,  they  also 
drove  down  the  value  of the  currency. 
Indeed,  the  IMF  seems  incapable  of accepting  the idea that  higher  interest  rates  might  increase 
the  demand  for  foreign  currency  by  more  than  it  increases  supply  in  a  period  of  crisis  and  thus 
aggravate  conditions.  For  example,  Camdessus  (1998:  2) notes  that  “the  key  lesson  of the  ‘tequila 
crisis’  [was]  a timely  and  forceful  tightening  of  interest  rates..  . to  make  it more  attractive  to  hold 
domestic  currency.”  Fischer  (1998:  4)  uses  virtually  identical  language.  But,  they  both  refer  to 
examples  of  the  successful  use  of  high  interest  rates  to  defend  a fixed  exchange  rate,  not  to  the 
success  of the  policy  in conditions  after  the  devaluation  had  already  taken  place.”  In  this  regard  it 
is interesting  to  note  that  BIS  (1997:  108) refers  to  “the  increases  in (or  continued  high)  real interest 
rates.  . . in Indonesia  and  Thailand.  and in Malaysia”  that  had been  put  in place already  during  1996 
and  early  1997. 
After  a substantial  devaluation,  for  a company  with  foreign  exposure,  a higher  interest  rate 
only  makes  bankruptcy  more  probable.  For  a foreign  lender,  seeking  to  recover  funds  there  is no 
increase  in interest  rates  that  can  offset  the  bankruptcy  of a creditor.  Again,  it is interesting  to  note 
that  BIS  (1997:  111)  refers  to  the  successful  experience  of both  the  US  and  Sweden  of using  low 
interest  rate  policies  to  resolve  collapsing  asset  and  real  estate  prices. 
At  the  same  time,  the  breakdown  of  the  financial  system  made  it  impossible  for  firms  to 
increase  production  or exports,  so that  while  trade  balances  improved  sharply,  this was  primarily  the 
result  of  massive  falls  in imports,  rather  than  increased  exports.  Thailand  and  Korea  both  showed 
surpluses  by the  end  of  1997,  but  this  had  little  positive  impact  on exchange  rates.  For  the  month  of 
January  1998,  imports  in Korea  fell  at  a 40  per  cent  annual  rate,  and  in Thailand  at  a 30  per  cent 
annual  rate. 
Since  banks  were  also  part  of  this  process,  the  equivalent  for  a bank  of the  distress  sale  of 
assets  is to  call in loans,  or  to  retuse  to  make  loans.  The  result  was  that  short-term  inter-bank  and 
commercial  paper  markets  disappeared  in many  countries,  and firms were  unable  to  get  financing  for 
”  Although the IMF has also criticised the Asian countries for the stability  of their exchange  rates, cf. Fischer (1998). 
19 imports  required  for  production,  or even to  obtain  credit  to  finance  exports.  Further,  the  decision  to 
reform  the  bang  system  by  requiring  rapid  bank  closures  created  widespread  distrust  in  the 
remaining  banks,  and  in many  economies,  including  Hong  Kong,  there  were  large  scale  withdrawals 
of  deposits  from  the  banks,  pushing  even  solid  banks  to  difficulty  and  reducing  even  further  their 
ability  to  lend  to  support  production.  Thus,  the’policies  introduced  created  conditions  of Ml-scale 
debt  deflation  in which  banks  and  firms  were  forced  to  sell assets  to  make  payments,  driving  down 
prices  in both  stock  markets  and in the  foreign  exchange  markets.  Thus,  the  second  stage  of the  crisis 
involved  the  sustained  meltdown  of asset  markets  throughout  December  1997 and January  1998. By 
the  time  the  IM3  had  been  convinced  to  introduce  additional  freedom  (the  conditions  on  all three 
lending  agreements  were  reviewed  and rewritten  with  more  lenient  conditions  on fiscal positions  and 
interest  rates  in the beginning  of  1998), conditions  had  deteriorated  to the  point  that  it is unlikely  that 
there  will be positive  growth  in the  region  in  1998  and  there  is some  question  about  1999. 
This  phase  of collapsing  production  and income  in Asia is reflected  in the  sharp falls that  have 
occurred  in primary  commodity  prices  and  oil prices.  Thus,  the  greatest  negative  impact  from  the 
crisis  outside  Asia  has been  in other  developing  countries  and  in the  petroleum  producing  countries. 
It would  not  be  surprising  if a number  of the  former  should  have  to  apply  to  the  IMF  for  balance  of 
payments  support  as a result  of the  Asian  crisis. 
Clearly,  a  more  reasoned  response  to  the  crisis  would  have  been  to  attempt  to  slow  the 
withdrawal  of foreign  lending  and  to  ease  the  conditions  of payment.  Low,  rather  than  high  interest 
rates  would  have  been  indicated,  along  with  policies  to stimulate  growth.  But,  most  important  would 
have  been  rapid  policies  to reschedule  foreign  loans  to  stop  the mad rush  to sell assets  and buy foreign 
currency.  This  has  now  started  to  occur  in the  case  of Korea,  which  has  reached  agreement  with 
international  bank  lenders  to  roll  over  the  short  term  debt  owed  by Korean  banks. 
The  first  step  in the  third  phase  of the  crisis will then  be to  restore  stability  to  asset  markets, 
which  means  having  both  buyers  and  sellers,  borrowers  and  lenders.  This  will  allow  producers  to 
increase  exports  and  the  process  of adjustment  to begin. However,  much  of the  productive  capacity 
will in fact  be  closed  by bankruptcy.  And  the  fall in prices  will be less  than  the  change  in exchange 
rates  due  to  the  fact  that  most  Asian  exports  are import-intensive,  so that  import  costs  will be rising 
in dollar  terms,  and  domestic  costs  will  also  be rising  as the  impact  of depreciation  on the  domestic 
20 price  level works  through  to domestic  costs.  It is also likely that  capital  flows  will also return,  through 
foreign  purchases  of  domestic  productive  capacity  (to  operate  or  to  close,  as  occurred  in  East 
Germany).  It is for  this  reason  that  it is difficult  to  determine  appropriate  exchange  rates.  At  current 
exchange  rates,  this  process  should  be extremely  rapid,  and will certainly  bring  calls from  developed 
countries,  swamped  with  imports,  for  protection  measures.  It would  be ironic  if the  liberal&ion  of 
capital  flows,  which  the  IMF  has now  declared  as its major  objective,  should  lead  to  a deterioration 
in the  free  trade  in goods  and services,  which  was  to be its original  objective.  The  crisis  suggests  that 
the  two  are  interdependent,  and  perhaps  cannot  be  achieved  simultaneously.  Given  that  this  is 
precisely  the  scenario  which  was  the  prelude  to  the  global  crisis  of  the  193Os,  the  collapse  of  the 
global  capital  markets  in response  to the  crisis was  simply  playing  according  to  the  script.  It remains 
to  be  seen  if policy  can be  crafted  so as to  avoid  a repeat  of the  1930s. 
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